Stacey Properties v. Ben Wixen, Francine Wixen, Bernie Goler and Bonnie Goler : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1988
Stacey Properties v. Ben Wixen, Francine Wixen,
Bernie Goler and Bonnie Goler : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Robert M Anderson, William P Schwartz; Hansen & Anderson; Attorney for Appellant.
Clark Waddoups, Ronald G Russell; Kimball, Parr, Crockett & Waddoups; Attorneys for
Respondents.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Stacey Properties v. Wixen, No. 880127.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2051
BRIEF 
IT 
DO.. .j.»,idiT 
K F U 
50 
A10 
DOCKET NO. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ft -c?/ g 7 - rv f 
STACEY PROPERTIES, a Utah 
limited partnership, 
Appellant, 
v. 
BEN WIXEN, FRANCINE WIXEN, 
BERNIE GOLER and BONNIE GOLER, 
Respondents and 
Cross-Appellants, 
88-0127 
Appeal No. 860527 
^, ft 
^*w % 
APPELLANT STACEY PROPERTIES' OPENING BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE HONORABLE DAVID E. ROTH, DISTRICT JUDGE, PRESIDING 
Robert M. Anderson 
William P. Schwartz 
HANSEN & ANDERSON 
50 West Broadway, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Clark Waddoups 
Ronald G. Russell 
KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS 
135 South State #1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondent and Cross-Appellant 
IS Ik 
j AN 2 91987 sih 
Clerk, Su,... 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STACEY PROPERTIES, a Utah 
limited partnership, 
Appellant, 
v. 
BEN WIXEN, FRANCINE WIXEN, 
BERNIE GOLER and BONNIE GOLER, 
Respondents and 
Cross-Appellants, 
Appeal No. 860527 
APPELLANT STACEY PROPERTIES' OPENING BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE HONORABLE DAVID E. ROTH, DISTRICT JUDGE, PRESIDING 
Robert M. Anderson 
William P. Schwartz 
HANSEN & ANDERSON 
50 West Broadway, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Clark Waddoups 
Ronald G. Russell 
KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS 
185 South State #1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondent and Cross-Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Nature of Appeal 1 
Statement of Issues Presented on Appeal 1 
I. Whether the District Court Erred in Denying 1 
Appellant the Right to Accelerate the Promissory 
Note Executed by Respondents. 
II. Whether the District Court Erred in Failing 1 
to Award Appellant Its Expenses and Attorneys' 
Fees Incurred in Enforcing the Provisions of the 
Promissory Note Executed by Respondents. 
Statement of Facts 1 
A. The Property Transaction 1 
B. The Dispute ....2 
C. The Trial 4 
Summary of Argument 7 
A. The District Court Erred in Denying 7 
Appellant the Right to Accelerate the Note. 
B. The District Court Erred in Failing 9 
to Award Appellant Its Expenses and Attorneys' 
Fees Incurred in Enforcing the Promissory Note. 
Argument 11 
Point 1. The District Court Erred in 11 
Denying Appellant the Right to Accelerate 
the Promissory Note Executed by Respondents. 
A. At the Time of Trialf Respondents' 11 
Proven Offsets Were Less Than the Amount of 
Past Due Installments. 
B. Because, at the Time of Trial, 14 
Respondents' Proven Offsets Were Less Than the 
Amount of Past Due Installments Appellant Was 
Entitled to Accelerate the Note. 
- i -
C. Appellant's Right to Acceleration and 18 
Respondents' Offset Claims Should be Determined 
as of the Time of Trial. 
D. The Acceleration Provision 22 
Should Be Enforced According to Its Terms and 
Respondents' Judgment Should be Set Off Against 
the Accelerated Balance. 
Point 2. The District Court Erred in Failing 25 
to Award Appellant its Expenses and Attorneys' Fees 
Incurred in Enforcing the Promissory Note Executed by 
Respondents. 
A. Regardless of Appellant's Success on the 25 
Acceleration Issue, it is Entitled to Recover 
its Expenses and Fees Reduced in Proportion to 
Respondents' Successful Offsets and Counterclaims. 
Conclusion: Relief Requested 31 
- ii -
Cases: 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Battle Creek Bread Wrapping Mach. Co. v. Paramount 16 
Baking Co., 88 Utah 67, 39 P.2d 323 (Utah 1934) 
Briqgs v. Briggs, 263 P.2d 73 (Cal. App. 1953) 8, 17, 
18, 19, 21 
Browne v. Nowlin, 570 P.2d 1246 (Az. 1977) 22 
Canton Hardware Co. v. Haller, 53 N.E.2d 509 8, 15, 16, 
(Ohio 1944) 17, 18, 19, 21 
Foreman v. Myers, 444 P.2d 589 (N.M. 1968) 23 
Haines v. Commercial Mortgage Co., 255 P. 805 17 
(Cal. 1927) 
Hardinage Co. v. Eimco Corp., 1 Utah 2d 320, 8, 14 
266 P.2d 494 (Utah 1954) 
Jacobsen v. McClanahan, 264 P.2d 253 (Wash. 1953) 23 
Kixx, Inc. v. Stallion Music, Inc., 610 P.2d 23 
1385 (Utah 1980) 
McBain v. Pratt, 514 P.2d 823 (Alaska 1973) 8, 15 
Messner v. Mallory, 236 P.2d 898 (Cal. 1951) 23 
Phelps Dodge Copper Prod. Corp. v. 25 
Alpha Const. Co., 455 P.2d 555 (Kan. 1969) 
Schweiger v. China Doll Restaurant, Inc., 29 
673 P.2d 927 (Az. App. 1983) 
Shepard v. Top Hat Land & Cattle Co., 560 P.2d 8, 15 
730 (Wyo. 1977) 
Smith v. Certified Realty Corp., 585 P.2d 23 
293 (Colo. App. 1978) 
Sugar v. Miller, 315 P.2d 862 (Utah 1957) 11, 28 
Vaughn v. Vaughn, 428 P.2d. 50 (Id. 1967) 26 
Wells v. Cobb, 455 S.2d 1069 (Fla. App. 1984) 8 
- iii -
Williamson v, Wanlassf 545 P.2d 1145 20 
(Utah 1976) 
York Plumbing & Heating Co, v. Gronsman, 25 
443 P-2d 986 (Colo. 1968) 
Other Authorities: 
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 12 
Annot., 42 A.L.R.2d 677 11, 28, 29 
Williston on Contracts §622 ;' 15 
- iv 
NATURE OF APPEAL 
This is an appeal from a final judgment entered on 
September 15, 1986, by the District Court for the Second 
Judicial District Court, Weber County, the Honorable David 
E. Roth presiding. A copy of the judgment from which this 
appeal is taken is included in the addendum hereto as 
Exhibit A. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
entered in conjunction with the judgment are included in the 
addendum hereto as Exhibit B. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. Whether the District Court Erred in Denying Appellant 
the Right to Accelerate the Promissory Note Executed by 
Respondents; 
II. Whether the District Court Erred in Failing to Award 
Appellant Its Expenses and Attorneys' Fees Incurred in 
Enforcing the Provisions of the Promissory Note Executed by 
Respondents. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. The Property Transaction. 
On May 22, 1984, appellant Stacey Properties 
(hereinafter "Stacey") sold several commercial properties 
located in and around Ogden, Utah to the respondents, Mr. 
and Mrs. Ben Wixen and Mr. and Mrs. Bonnie Goler. (Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, hereinafter "Findings & 
Conclusions," 111; R-496). Those properties included the 
main Ogden post office building and the Commonwealth Square 
shopping center in Sunset, Utah. (Id.) The terms of the 
sale between the parties were reduced to a written "letter 
agreement." (_Id). (A copy of the letter agreement is 
included in the addendum hereto as Exhibit "C"). As partial 
payment for the properties, the respondents individually 
executed a promissory note (hereinafter the "Note") payable 
to Stacey in the amount of $80,000, with monthly 
installments payable in the amount of $731.79 beginning on 
June 1, 1984. (Id. at 1!4; R-496). (A copy of the Note is 
included in the addendum hereto as Exhibit "D"). 
B. The Dispute. 
Respondents failed to make the first installment 
payment due on June 1, 1984, and did not make the July 1, 
1984 payment until August 29, 1984. (Id. at 113; R-496). 
Indeed, with the exception of two payments made in August of 
1984, respondents failed entirely to make any installment 
payments owing to Stacey. (Ijd. at 1113 and 6; R-496-497). 
On September 5, 1984, after having failed to make the 
September 1, 1984 payment, respondents sent a letter to 
Stacey stating that respondents were exercising their right 
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under the Note to offset their installment payments with a 
$23f425.61 expense incurred by them in replacing an air 
conditioning unit at the Ogden post office. (^ d. at 115; 
R-497). Subsequent to the offset regarding the air 
conditioning unit, respondents offset their installment 
payments under the Note with expenses associated with 
repairing fire sprinklers ($1,190.00), sewers ($1,037.83), 
sidewalks ($7,600.00) and electrical circuits ($1,171.20); 
similarly, respondents offset their payments with "credits" 
allegedly owing them by Stacey for property taxes 
($3,210.87) and for a security deposit ($5,584.00). 
(Exhibits D-33, 34, 35, 36; P-6; TR-407). Finally, and most 
significant for purposes of this appeal, respondents claimed 
an offset in the amount of $46,000 to $48,000 for the 
"estimated" cost of replacing the Ogden post office roof. 
(Id.) 
In response to respondents' failure to make their 
payments owing under the Note, Stacey notified respondents 
by a letter dated September 12, 1984 that, pursuant to the 
acceleration provision contained in the Note, Stacey was 
accelerating the due date of the principal balance owing 
under the Note. (Findings and Conclusions at 11 7; R-497). 
Respondents thereafter failed to make payment to Stacey of 
the principal balance owing, or of any installment, thereby 
causing Stacey to file a Complaint in the Second District 
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Court, Weber County, seeking the principal balance owing on 
the Note, plus expenses and attorneys' fees associated with 
enforcing the provisions of the Note. (Icl. at 11 6; R-497; 
Complaint, R-l-4). In response to Staceyfs Complaint, 
respondents defended by asserting that the Note could not be 
accelerated in light of respondents1 right under the Note to 
offset their installment payments"with expenses incurred by 
them as a result of Stacey1s breaches of warranty. (Answer, 
R-37). Additionally, respondents asserted various breach of 
warranty counterclaims against Stacey for which respondents 
sought money damages. (Counterclaim, R-38-43). 
C. The Trial. 
This matter was tried to the court on May 28, 29 and 
30, 1986. (R-298-309). As of May 1, 1986, the accrued 
amount of unpaid installment payments owing under the Note 
amounted to $16,099.38. (Findings and Conclusions at 11 6; 
R-497). At trial, respondents asserted "offsets" against 
those unpaid installments, plus future installments, in the 
total amount of $83,079.31, as specifically described below: 
a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
e. 
f. 
Replacement of Ogden post 
office air conditioner: 
Commonwealth sewer repair: 
Ogden post office roof 
replacement: 
Commonwealth sidewalk repair: 
Commonwealth electrical repair: 
Property tax adjustment: 
$25,063, 
$1,037, 
$43,750, 
$7,600, 
$1,409. 
$3,028, 
.80 
.83 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.58 
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Commonwealth fire sprinkler 
repair: $1,190,00 
Total offsets claimed: $83,079.31 
(Findings and Conclusions at 11 9; R-498). 
After hearing the evidence, the court determined that 
the respondents had properly offset their note payments 
pursuant to the Note in the total amount of $8,112.94, 
specifically as described below: 
a. Replacement of Ogden post office 
air conditioner: 
b. Commonwealth sewer repair: 
c. Ogden post office roof 
replacement: 
d. Commonwealth sidewalk repair: 
e. Commonwealth electrical repair: 
f. Property tax adjustment: 
g. Commonwealth fire sprinkler: 
Total offsets proven: 
(Findings and Conclusions at 1111 13(a)(3), 13(b)(2), 
13(c)(4), 13(d)(2), 13(e)(2), 13(f)(2), 13(g)(2); R-502-
505). 
Significantly, the district court found that the 
respondents were not entitled under the Note to offset their 
note payments with any of the "estimated cost" of replacing 
the Ogden post office roof because respondents had not 
actually spent any amount on the roof, and did not therefore 
incur any reimbursable expense with which to offset their 
$6, 
$1 , 
$8, 
,899. 
,213. 
$0, 
$0. 
$0. 
$0. 
$0. 
,112. 
.39* 
.55* 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.94* 
*This amount included prejudgment interest from the 
date respondents incurred the expense associated with the 
repair. (Findings and Conclusions at 1 13(a)(3), 13(b)(2); 
R-502-503). 
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note payments. (Id. at 11 13(c)(4); R-504). The district 
court, however, did find that Stacey breached its warranty 
under the letter agreement to make such repairs as were 
necessary to keep the post office roof in a watertight 
condition and therefore awarded respondents actual damages 
in the amount of $12,250 pursuant to respondents1 
counterclaim for breach of warranty.1 (^ d. at 13(c)(1) and 
(3); R-503-504). 
Based upon the authorities presented to the district 
court at the conclusion of trial, Stacey contended that it 
was entitled to accelerate the Note because the past due 
installment payments ($16,099.38) were greater than the 
legitimate offsets against those payments proven by 
defendants ($8,112.94). (R-369-374; R-387-392) . The 
district court, however, concluded that Stacey was not 
entitled to accelerate the Note because (1) at the time of 
Stacey's "attempted acceleration," the respondents possessed 
legitimate offsets in excess of the installment payments in 
^Stacey's warranty relating to the post office roof 
was limited in duration under the letter agreement to sixty-
seven months. (See, Letter Agreement at p. 2, included in 
the addendum hereto as Exhibit "C"). Because of the limited 
duration of the warranty, the district court concluded that 
the respondents would receive a "windfall" by recovering as 
damages the full replacement cost of a new twenty year roof 
($49,000). (Findings and Conclusions at 1! 13(c)2; R-503; 
TR-585). The court reasoned that the period of Stacey1s 
warranty was approximately twenty-five percent of twenty 
years and therefore awarded respondents twenty-five percent 
of the cost of a twenty year roof (.25)($49,000), or 
$12,250. (TR-585). 
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arrears under the Note, and (2) acceleration was a harsh 
remedy and inappropriate in light of respondents' partially 
successful counterclaim relating to the post office roof. 
(Findings and Conclusions at 1(11 14, 15, 16; R-505-506). 
Additionally, Stacey contended in the Complaint and at 
trial that it was entitled to recover its expenses and 
attorneys1 fees incurred in enforcing the terms of the 
Note. (Complaint, R-4; TR-3). The district court, however, 
concluded that Staceyfs right to its expenses and fees was 
conditioned upon its prevailing on the acceleration issue; 
having determined that Stacey was not entitled to accelerate 
the Note, the court therefore determined that Stacey could 
not recover its expenses and attorneys' fees. (Findings and 
Conclusions at 11 20; R-506). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Erred in Denying Appellant the 
Right to Accelerate the Note. 
This appeal involves the judicial construction of the 
interrelationship between two separate provisions of the 
Note executed by the respondents. The first of those 
provisions, the "acceleration clause," granted Stacey the 
right to accelerate the due date of the principal amount 
owing upon the respondents1 failure to make installment 
payments at the time and in the manner required by the 
Note. The second of those provisions, the "offset clause," 
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gave respondents the right to offset against their 
installment payments any "reimbursements" owing them by 
Stacey pursuant to the terms of the letter agreement. 
The few jurisdictions which have considered the 
interrelationship between competing rights of acceleration 
and offset have uniformly held that acceleration is proper 
in the face of competing offset claims if the amount of the 
offsets proven at trial is less than the accrued amount in 
arrears under the note. Seef e.g., Canton Hardware Co. v. 
Haller, 53 N.E.2d 509 (Ohio 1944); Briggs v. Briggs, 263 
P.2d 73 (Cal. App. 1953). Stated conversely, if the amount 
of proven offsets at trial is greater than the amount in 
arrears under the note, then acceleration is improper. Id.; 
Wells v. Cobb, 455 S.2d 1069 (Fla. App. 1984). This rule, 
in addition to carrying significant precedential weight, is 
well-supported by the recognized principle of contract 
construction that competing contractual provisions should be 
interpreted, wherever possible, to give meaning and effect 
to both provisions, rather than to nullify one provision in 
favor of the other. See, e.g., Hardinage Co. v. Eimco 
Corp., 1 Utah 2d 320, 266 P.2d 494, 495 (Utah 1954); Shepard 
v. Top Hat Land & Cattle Co., 560 P.2d 730, 732 (Wyo. 1977); 
McBain v. Pratt, 514 P.2d 823, 828 (Alaska 1973). 
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The district court, however, failed to apply this 
rule. As has been stated, the accrued amount in arrears 
under the Note at the time of trial was $16,099.38. While 
respondents claimed offsets in the amount of $83,079.31, 
they proved their entitlement to offsets only in the amount 
of $8,112.94, which was far less than the amount of past due 
installments. Applying the $8,112.94 in offsets as a credit 
against past due installments satisfied respondents1 payment 
obligation only through June of 1985; thereafter, they were 
in default under the terms of the Note and Stacey was 
entitled to accelerate the due date of the principal 
balance. (See, Exhibit P-2c; TR-73-74) (A copy of Exhibit 
P-2c is included in the addendum hereto as Exhibit "E"). 
B. The District Court Erred in Failing to Award 
Appellant Its Expenses and Attorneys' Fees Incurred in 
Enforcing the Promissory Note. 
The Note executed by respondents contained a provision 
wherein the respondents agreed to pay Stacey any expenses 
and attorneys' fees incurred by Stacey in enforcing the 
provisions of the Note. (Exhibit P-l, included in the 
addendum hereto as Exhibit "D"). In attempting to obtain 
payment from respondents under the Note, Stacey went to 
great expense to prepare a defense against respondents' 
numerous offset claims; those claims, if successfully 
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asserted by respondents, would have completely extinguished 
the $80f000 Note owing to Stacey by respondents. 
As has been stated, the bulk of respondents1 offset 
claims proved meritless at trial; after reducing the 
principal balance owing under the Note in the appropriate 
amounts for the offset and damage claims actually proven by 
respondents/ Stacey vindicated its entitlement to payment 
under the Note in the principal amount of $67,249.83,2 plus 
interest. The district court, however, refused even to hear 
Stacey*s argument concerning its entitlement to its expenses 
and fees, reasoning that Stacey1s failure to prevail on the 
acceleration issue negated entirely its right to expenses 
and fees. (Findings and Conclusions at 11 20; R-506). 
The district court's ruling is in clear derogation of 
the law as enunciated both by the Utah Supreme Court and a 
majority of other jurisdictions. That law provides that an 
attorneys' fees provision in a promissory note is not 
^This amount is calculated as follows: 
Principal Amount of Note $80,000.00 
Less Payment of Principal 
(R'cvd. 8/1/84 & 8/29/84) (64.42)* 
Less Amount of Offset Claims 
Amortized to Principal (435.75)* 
Less Judgment re Post 
Office Roof (12,250.00) 
TOTAL $67,249.83 
*See, Amortization Schedule included in the 
addendum hereto as Exhibit ,fFM. 
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negated by the adverse party's successful assertion of 
setoffs or counterclaims unless such claims are in an amount 
in excess of the amount due under the note. See, e.g.f 
Sugar v. Miller, 315 P.2d 862 (Utah 1957); Annot., 42 
A.L.R.2d 677, If such claims are less than the amount owing 
under the note, then the attorneys' fees provision remains 
in forcef and the amount of awardable fees is simply reduced 
in proportion to the adverse party's success on its setoffs 
or counterclaims. Id. 
Applying those principles in the present case can 
yield but one conclusion, regardless of Stacey's success or 
lack of success on the acceleration issue. Because the 
amount of respondents' proven offsets and counterclaims was 
far less than the amount owing under the Note at the 
conclusion of trial, Stacey is entitled to recover its 
expenses and attorneys' fees, including those associated 
with this appeal, reduced in proportion to respondents' 
success on their offsets and counterclaims. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. The District Court Erred in Denying 
Appellant the Right to Accelerate the 
Promissory Note Executed by Respondents. 
A. At the Time of Trial, Respondents' Proven Offsets 
Were Less Than the Amount of Past Due Installments. 
Pursuant to the note executed by respondents, 
respondents were given the right "to offset" their note 
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payments with "reimbursements due [them] under §17 of [the] 
letter agreement or any other provision thereof."3 (Exhibit 
P-l, included in the addendum hereto as Exhibit "D"). Thus, 
the term "offset" was given a technical meaning under the 
Note and was limited to certain reimbursable items. The 
verb "reimburse," according to Webster's New Collegiate 
Dictionary, means "to pay back to'someone," or "to repay"; a 
reimbursement, therefore, requires that the person being 
reimbursed make some payment in the first instance which is 
the subject of the reimbursement, or "repayment." By 
definition then, respondents' right to offset their note 
payments was conditioned upon their making some payment, or 
incurring some expense, for which they were entitled to a 
"reimbursement" from Stacey pursuant to the letter 
agreement. 
The district court adopted the above interpretation of 
the meaning of the offset provision, and concluded that 
JThe relevant language from the Note is as follows: 
Makers shall have the right to 
offset against any amounts due or to 
become due to Properties under this 
Note any such reimbursement due to 
Makers under Section 17 of said 
letter agreement or under any other 
provision thereof . . ." . 
4Indeed, respondents' own counsel concurred with 
this interpretation and stated to the court that the 
respondents' offset claims were properly limited to those 
items for which the respondents had "outlayed cash." 
- 12 -
under the terms of the Note the respondents could only 
offset their installment payments with items for which they 
had incurred a reimbursable expense. (See, e.g./ Findings 
and Conclusions at 1113(e)(4); R-504; TR-581-586). 
Therefore, the court properly and expressly concluded that 
the "respondents were not entitled under the contract to 
offset their note payments with any of the estimated cost of 
replacing the [Ogden post office] roof" because respondents 
"had incurred no out-of-pocket expenses with respect to said 
roof."5 (Id. 6 1113(c)(4); 1113(e)(4); R-504). However, the 
district court did determine that, pursuant to the terms of 
the Note and letter agreement, respondents proved their 
entitlement to offset their installment payments in the 
total amount of $8,112.94 for expenses incurred in replacing 
the post office air conditioner and in repairing a sewer 
line. (Id. at 1113(a)(3), 13(b)(2); R-502-503). This 
amount was far less than the cumulative amount of 
installment payments in default under the Note at the time 
(Tr. - 472, 477-78). 
5As has been stated, however, the court did award 
respondents $12,250 in damages as a percentage of the 
estimated cost of replacing the roof pursuant to 
respondents1 breach of war:anty counterclaim. (Findings and 
Conclusions at 11 13(c)(3); R-504). While the court ordered 
that respondents1 judgment in that amount could be set off 
against respondents' note payments, the court expressly 
concluded that respondents had no right under the Note to 
set off any amount relating to the post office roof. (Id. 
at II 13(c) (4); R-504) . 
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of trial ($16,099.38). (Id. at 11 6; R-497). 
B. Because, at the Time of Trial, Respondents1 Proven 
Offsets Were Less Than the Past Due Installments Owing Under 
the Note, Appellant Was Entitled to Accelerate the Note. 
The present dispute reveals the conflict inherent 
between the acceleration and offset provisions contained in 
the Note. Respondents had the plain right under the Note to 
offset certain reimbursable expenses for which Stacey was 
obligated. Stacey, on the other hand, had the right under 
the Note to timely payment of the installments and the 
concomitant right to accelerate the entire balance owing in 
the absence of timely payment of those installments. 
It has been respondents1 position that their mere 
assertion of offset rights prevented Stacey1s acceleration 
of the Note. (R-380-381). That interpretation, however/ 
illustrates a myopic reading of the Note and renders the 
acceleration provision meaningless. Clearly, an accelera-
tion provision which cannot be exercised in the face of a 
claimed right of offset grants respondents the power to veto 
acceleration at any time for any reason, regardless of its 
merit, as long as the veto is framed as an "offset." Such 
an interpretation flies in the face of the fundamental rule 
of contract construction that competing contractual 
provisions should be interpreted to give meaning and effect 
to both provisions, rather than to nullify one or the 
- 14 -
other. See, e.g., Hardinage Co. v. Eimco Corp., 1 Utah 2d 
320, 266 P.2d 494, 495 (Utah 1954) ("It is fundamental that 
if effect can be given to both of two apparently conflicting 
provisions in a reasonable reconciliation that interpreta-
tion will control." citing, 3 Williston on Contracts, §622); 
Shepard v. Top Hat Land & Cattle Co., 560 P.2d 730, 732 
(Wyo. 1977); McBain v. Pratt, 514 P.2d 823, 828 (Alaska 
1973). 
The only construction of the Note which gives meaning 
and effect to both the offset and acceleration provisions is 
one that (1) allows respondents the right to offset their 
note payments; and (2) allows Stacey the right to accelerate 
the Note balance when the offsets taken prove to be 
insufficient to satisfy the accrued amount of installments 
in arrears under the Note. Under such a circumstance, the 
respondents have abused their offset rights and are in 
default of their obligations under the Note. In the face of 
such a default, Stacey should be entitled to acceleration. 
This logical approach is well supported by the few 
reported cases which have considered analogous factual 
situations. Most significant among these is Canton Hardware 
Co. v. Haller, 53 N.E.2d 509 (Ohio 1944), a well reasoned 
decision by the Ohio Supreme Court. In Canton Hardware, a 
buyer of goods attempted to offset its installment payments 
owing under a promissory note because of an alleged breach 
- 15 -
of warranty on the part of the seller. The seller, relying 
upon an acceleration provision in the note, claimed that the 
buyer was in default under the note and that acceleration 
was therefore proper. 
Recognizing the competing nature of the rights 
asserted by the parties, the Canton Hardware court concluded 
that acceleration was proper because the damages proven by 
the buyer at trial were less than the installment payments 
owing under the note. Noting the dearth of authority on the 
precise issue presented, the court found support for its 
conclusion in analogous decisions from other courts, 
including the Utah Supreme Court, holding that replevin 
actions are not defeated by the buyer's offset claims, 
unless the offsets equal or exceed the amount of past-due 
payments owing under the sales agreement. See, e.g., Battle 
Creek Bread Wrapping Mach. Co. v. Paramount Baking Co., 88 
Utah 67, 39 P.2d 323 (Utah 1934). Additionally, in reaching 
its conclusion, the Canton Hardware court noted that the 
buyer had the clear option of keeping its payments current 
under the note, thereby preventing acceleration, while 
instituting a breach of warranty action against the 
seller. Instead, the buyer chose the riskier course of 
action in suspending its payments under the note in the 
confidence that it could prevail on its breach of warranty 
offset claim. Having failed in this regard, it was not 
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unjust for the buyer to bear the consequences of 
acceleration associated with its own risky behavior. 
Similarly/ the California courts have adopted the 
position enunciated in Canton Hardware. In Briggs v. 
Briggs, 263 P.2d 73 (Cal. App. 1953) the maker of a 
promissory note attempted to offset a $90.00 note payment 
with a $103.35 offset claim. The' trial court, finding that 
the offset was properly taken, held that the payee could not 
accelerate the note. The appellate court, however, reversed 
the trial court finding that the proper amount of the 
maker's offset was only $51.67, and less than the defaulted 
$90 payment; it therefore concluded that the payee was 
entitled to accelerate the note. See also, Haines v. 
Commercial Mortgage Co., 255 P. 805 (Cal. 1927). 
Thus, both well-established principles of contract 
construction and the above-cited authorities compel the 
conclusion that the respondents1 mere assertion of offset 
rights should not negate the acceleration clause in the 
promissory note. Rather, the acceleration clause should 
remain enforceable and be given effect by this Court as the 
amount of respondents' legitimate offsets against their Note 
payments proved at trial to be far less than the amount of 
past due installment payments owing under the Note. 
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C. Appellant's Right to Acceleration and Respondents1 
Offset Claims Should be Determined as of the Time of 
Trial, 
While the district court did not expressly reject the 
rule enunciated in Canton Hardware and Briggs, it concluded 
that the proper time to determine whether acceleration was 
proper was "at the time of the" attempted acceleration.11 
(Findings and Conclusions at 11 14; R-505). According to the 
district court/ the time of "attempted acceleration" was 
when Stacey "notified" respondents of its acceleration 
through its letter in September of 1984 and at the time 
Stacey filed its Complaint in December of 1984; 
significantlyf the Court did not extend its concept of 
"attempted acceleration" to the time of trial. 
In September of 1984f when Stacey first notified 
respondents of its attempted acceleration/ the cumulative 
amount of defaulted installments amounted only to $1/463.58 
(See, Exhibit P-2c); in December of 1984/ when Stacey filed 
its Complaint against respondents/ the unpaid installments 
amounted to $3/658.95. (Seef Id.) (Exhibit P-2c is included 
in the addendum hereto as Exhibit "E"). According to the 
district court/ because the offsets proven by respondents at 
the time of trial amounted to $8/112.94/ and were greater 
than the accrued installments owing at the time of the 
"attempted acceleration" (September and December/ 1984) , the 
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district court concluded that Stacey could not accelerate 
the Note. (Findings and Conclusions at 1111 14 and 15; R-505-
506). Implicit in the court's decision was the conclusion 
that Stacey's notification of acceleration was, in effect, 
too early in that it was given prior to the effective date 
of respondents1 "default", the date when respondents' 
payment obligations were no longer' satisfied by their proven 
offsets. 
Aside from being without any precedential support and 
running contrary to the holdings of both the Canton Hardware 
and Briggs decisions/ the district court's conclusion in 
this regard runs contrary to public policy, is unfair, and 
should therefore be rejected. In effect, the court's ruling 
would require a party seeking acceleration under these 
circumstances to give "notice" of acceleration, or to 
institute legal proceedings, at the precise moment when 
"legitimate" offset claims were exceeded by the amount in 
default under the Note. Such guess work, aside from placing 
an oppressive and perhaps impossible burden on the note 
holder, serves no legitimate notification purpose where, as 
here, the maker has already been notified of the attempted 
acceleration. (This is especially true where, as here, the 
Note expressly grants the payee the right to accelerate the 
note at its option and without notice). 
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Additionally, by holding that Stacey's "attempted 
acceleration" was ineffectual because notification came too 
early, the district court has created a precedent directly 
opposed to the policy of prompt notification encouraged by 
this Court. Indeed, in Williamson v. Wanlass, 545 P.2d 
1145, 1147 (Utah 1976), this Court refused even to allow 
acceleration in light of the note holder's tardiness in 
invoking his acceleration right through his routine 
acceptance of late payments owing under the note. In light 
of Williamson, if Stacey had simply done nothing in the face 
of respondents' assertion of offset rights in place of 
making payments under the Note, it risked losing its right 
to invoke the acceleration provision. 
Under the circumstances presented by this case, it is 
inescapable that the right to acceleration should properly 
be determined as of the date of trial, rather than as of the 
date of "notification" of acceleration or as of the date 
when legal proceedings are instituted. First, it is clear 
that the note holder is invoking its acceleration right and 
"attempting to accelerate" every bit as much on the day of 
trial as on the day of initial notification of acceleration, 
or on the day the Complaint is filed. More important, only 
at trial can the legitimacy of offset claims be determined 
and a value be attached to those offsets. Prior to trial, 
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the true value of any offset is pure conjecture and 
therefore the right to acceleration is uncertain. 
Significantly, in the case at handf the amount of 
offsets claimed by respondents increased dramatically as the 
date of trial drew near. (See, Exhibits D-33, 34, 35, 36; 
P-6). The district court, however, paid no heed whatsoever 
to the time any of respondents1 offsets were first asserted, 
or that the amount and nature of specific offsets changed 
even during trial, but concluded merely that respondents 
were entitled at the time of trial to offsets (including 
substantial prejudgment interest) in the total amount of 
$8,112.94. It was thus exceedingly unfair to compare this 
offset amount, calculated with interest as of May 31, 1986, 
to the amount of defaulted installments as of September and 
December of 1984. Rather, the court should have properly 
applied an even-handed comparison as of the date of trial 
between the legitimate offsets proven and the cumulative 
amount in arrears under the Note. Under this approach, 
which was followed both in the Canton Hardware and Briggs 
decisions, Stacey plainly won the right to accelerate the 
Note by establishing that the proven offsets were far less 
than the amount in arrears under the Note at the time of 
trial. 
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Dm The Acceleration Provision Should Be Enforced 
According to Its Terms and Respondents' Judgment Should Be 
Set Off Against the Accelerated Balance. 
Finally, in concluding that Stacey was not entitled to 
accelerate the promissory note, the district court noted 
that "acceleration is a harsh remedy" which was 
"inappropriate" in light of respondents' partial success on 
their breach of warranty counterclaim relating to the Ogden 
post office roof. (Findings & Conclusions at 111116-17; 
R-506). Such observations reveal the court's reluctance to 
give full effect and meaning to the acceleration provision, 
which it apparently viewed as being punitive in nature and 
somehow not as worthy of firm judicial enforcement as other 
contractual provisions. 
Acceleration provisions, however, certainly enhance 
the availability of credit to persons possessing 
insufficient collateral to secure a loan and thereby serve 
an important public purpose. As numerous courts have noted, 
acceleration provisions provide security to the lender that 
the debt will be paid at the time required by the note. 
See, e.g., Browne v. Nowlin, 570 P.2d 1246 (Az. 1977). 
Where, as here, there is no collateral securing the note, 
bIn this regard, the Court noted at a post-trial 
conference that "I think the Utah Court has spoken on how it 
feels about acceleration, something that's not favored 
except under strict circumstances." (R-425). 
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the only security may be the acceleration provision; without 
the acceleration provision, an otherwise unsecured lender 
could only resort to the burdensome and expensive approach 
of suing upon default for the amount of accrued installments 
owing, rather than the full amount of the loan. Such a 
procedure would plainly create a disincentive to lending to 
those persons possessing insufficient collateral to secure a 
loan. 
Most courts, including the Utah Supreme Court, have 
lone recognized that acceleration provisions, like other 
agreed-upon contractual provisions, should be enforced 
"according to their terms." See, e.g., Kixx, Inc. v. 
Stallion Music, Inc., 610 P.2d 1385, 1388 (Utah 1980) citing 
Jacobsen v. McClanahan, 264 P.2d 253 (Wash. 1953); Messner 
v. Mallory, 236 P.2d 898 (Cal. 1951); Foreman v. Myers, 444 
P.2d 589 (N.M. 1968); Smith v. Certified Realty Corp., 585 
P.2d 293 (Colo. App. 1978). While this Court held in 
Williamson that a note holder may be estopped by its routine 
acceptance of late payments from suddenly "cracking down" on 
a note maker by demanding acceleration, such a ruling should 
not be extended beyond that context to weaken generally the 
enforceability of acceleration provisions. 
Finally, that respondents partially prevailed on their 
breach of warranty counterclaim relating to the post office 
roof does not make acceleration "inappropriate." As the 
- 23 -
district court correctly concluded, because the respondents 
had incurred no reimbursable expense relating to the roof, 
the "respondents were not entitled under the contract to 
offset their note payments with any of the estimated cost of 
replacing the roof." (Findings & Conclusions 1113(c)(4); R-
504). Therefore, the respondents1 claims relating to the 
roof could not constitute a substitute for their installment 
payments, or a defense to Stacey's contractual right to 
acceleration from the moment respondents were in default. 
As has been discussed, respondents1 offset defenses simply 
proved insufficient to prevent their default under the Note, 
or Stacey*s right to acceleration pursuant to the terms of 
the Note. That respondents obtained a money judgment 
against Stacey should not deprive Stacey of its rights 
established by the contract between the parties. 
To recapitulate, respondents proved their entitlement 
under the Note to offset their note payments in the amount 
of $8,112.94. Applying that amount as a credit against the 
installments owing under the Note satisfied respondents 
payment obligations only through June of 1985. (See, 
Exhibit P-2c, included in the addendum hereto as Exhibit 
"E"). Thereafter, respondents were in default under the 
terms of the Note and Stacey was entitled to the accelerated 
amount of principal owing from July 1, 1985, reduced in the 
amount of respondents1 judgment relating to the post office 
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roof, with interest on the balance at eighteen percent 
according to the terms of the Note. See, e.g., Phelps Dodge 
Copper Prod. Corp. v. Alpha Const. Co., 455 P.2d 555, 559 
(Kan. 1969) (,f [T]he existence of a setoff . . . which is 
unliquidated will not prevent the recovery of interest on 
the balance of the demand found due from the time it became 
due11); York Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Gronsman, 443 P.2d 
986, 988 (Colo. 1968)("Where a claim under an agreement is 
certain and liquidated, but is reduced because of the 
allowance of an unliquidated offset or counterclaim, 
interest may be allowed only on the balance due"). Such a 
result is neither "harsh" nor "inappropriate"; rather, such 
a result is the only one which enforces the agreement of the 
parties in a fair and even-handed manner. 
POINT 2. The District Court Erred in Failing 
to Award Appellant its Expenses and 
Attorneys1 Fees Incurred in Enforcing the 
Promissory Note Executed by Respondents. 
A. Regardless of Stacey's Success on the Acceleration 
Issue, it is Entitled to Recover its Expenses and Fees 
Reduced in Proportion to Respondents1 Successful Offsets and 
Counterclaims. 
In agreeing to provide respondents with partial 
financing to purchase the subject properties through the 
execution of a promissory note, Stacey insisted upon the 
insertion in the Note of an attorneys' fees provision in the 
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event of default. Such a provision was not an after-
thought, nor mere formalistic verbiage; rather, the 
provision was a material aspect of the agreement between the 
parties which, along with the acceleration provision, 
constituted Stacey's only security for its extension of 
credit to defendants. Cf•, Vaughn v. Vaughn, 428 P.2d. 50, 
54 (Id. 1967)("The purpose of an [attorneys' fees provision] 
is to indemnify the creditor against the necessity of paying 
an attorneys1 fee . . . and enable him to recover the full 
amount of his debt without deduction for legal expenses.") 
The provision agreed to by the parties herein reads as 
follows: 
Makers agree to pay any and all costs and 
expenses (regardless of the particular nature 
thereof and whether incurred with or without 
suit or before or after judgment, including 
reasonable attorneys' fees) which may be 
incurred by or in connection with the 
enforcement or performance of any of the 
rights of [Stacey] hereunder or under any 
agreement instrument or document connected 
with or related to this note. (emphasis 
added) 
(Exhibit P-l, included in the addendum hereto as Exhibit 
"D"). 
It should be emphasized that, after making only two 
payments on the Note, respondents began "offsetting" those 
payments and, in effect, cancelled the Note. By the time of 
trial, respondents' total offsets were well in excess of the 
$80,000 face value of the Note and Stacey was faced with the 
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prospect of receiving no additional payments under the 
Note. If Stacey was to avoid such a result, it had no 
alternative but to bring the present suit to enforce its 
right to payment under the Note. While respondents proved 
at trial their entitlement to offsets in the amount of 
$8f112.94, and damages in the amount of $12,250, Stacey won 
the right to substantial payment under the Note by 
successfully defending against the bulk of respondents1 
claims. • ^
 VT, ..... 
The district court, however, refused even to hear 
Staceyfs arguments concerning its entitlement to attorneys* 
fees and expenses because of the court's conclusion on the 
acceleration issue. (Findings and Conclusions at 11 20; R-
506; R-426). Although, as argued above, Stacey contends the 
district court erred in denying it the right to accelerate 
the Note, Stacey1s right to its fees and expenses should not 
be dependent upon the outcome of the acceleration issue. 
Under the plain language of the Note, Stacey is entitled to 
recover its expenses and attorneys' fees "incurred by or in 
connection with" its enforcement of any of its rights under 
the Note. Those rights were not limited to the right of 
acceleration upon respondents' default, but included the 
right to payment of the principal balance owing in the time 
and manner required by the Note — a right which had been 
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denied by respondents and which was substantially vindicated 
by Stacey at trial. 
That respondents were partially successful on their 
offsets and counterclaims does not negate the attorneys1 
fees provision in the Note. Under the law as enunciated in 
the majority of jurisdictions and in Utah, such claims do 
not prevent the enforcement of an attorneys' fees provision 
unless they are successfully asserted in an amount in excess 
of the balance owing under the note. For example, in Sugar 
v. Miller, 315 P.2d 862 (Utah 1957), this Court held that 
the payee under a $2,000 note could not collect its 
attorneys1 fees because the maker prevailed on counterclaims 
in the amount of $2,468.80. As this Court stated, "[a] 
litigant is not entitled to attorneys1 fees when the adverse 
party has an offset that is greater than the amount due 
under the instrument calling for attorneys' fees." Id. at 
865; see, also, Annot. 42 ALR 2d 677, 678 ("Most of the 
courts agree that where the defendant in an action on a note 
or similar evidence of indebtedness recovers on a 
counterclaim or the like in an amount in excess of the 
amount due on the note for principal and interest, the 
plaintiff is entitled to nothing for attorneys' 
fees . . . " ) . 
If, on the other hand, the offsets and counterclaims 
proven by the maker are less than the amount owing under the 
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note, then the payee is entitled to collect its expenses and 
attorneys1 fees, reduced in proportion to the maker's 
success. See, e.g., Schweiger v. China Doll Restaurant, 
Inc., 673 P.2d 927, 933 (Az. App. 1983)("When the plaintiff 
sues on a note, and the defendant successfully 
counterclaims, fees awarded to the plaintiff may be reduced 
to reflect the defendants' success"). As stated in Annot., 
42 ALR 2d 677, 681: 
The consensus of opinion of the courts is that 
where the holder of a note . . . containing a 
provision for the payment of attorneys^ fees 
brings action on the note, and the plaintiff's 
recovery is lessened but not completely 
extinguished by the defendant's recovery on a 
counterclaim or the like, the allowance of 
attorneys' fees should be proportionately cut 
down, the amount of recovery for such fees 
being based on the difference between the 
amount due on plaintiff's note less 
defendant's recovery on the counterclaim. 
Stacey, having won the right to payment of a 
substantial amount of the Note, is therefore entitled to its 
expenses and fees, reduced in proportion to respondents' 
success. Although the calculations necessary to determine 
the percentage of fees and expenses to which Stacey is 
entitled should properly be performed at the district court 
level on remand, Stacey has calculated those percentages 
below to illustrate the method by which it contends the 
calculations should be made: 
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A. If the Court permits acceleration: 
Principal amount of Note: $80,000.00 
Less payment of principal 
(R'cvd 8/1/84 & 8/29/84: ($64.42)* 
Less amount of offset claims 
amortized to principal: ($435.75)* 
Less judgment re post office roof: ($12,250.00) 
Adjusted accelerated principal 
balance due: $67,249.83 
Plus interest at 18% from 7/1/85 . 
(effective default date) until 
.5/30/86 (334 days): _ _ _ ^ ^$11,076.87 
Adjusted accelerated principal 
balance with interest as of 
5/30/86: $78,326.70 
Divided by accelerated principal 
balance of Note sought by Stacey 
at trial without adjustments 
($78,326.70/$lll,611.33): $111,611.33** 
Percentage of Staceyfs success and 
the fees and expenses to which it 
is entitled ($78,326.70/$lll,611.33): 70% 
B. If the Court does not permit acceleration:
 5 
Principal amount of Note: $80,000.00 
Less payment of principal 
(R'cvd 8/1/84 & 8/29/84): ($64.42)* 
*See, Amortization Schedule included in the 
addendum hereto as Exhibit "F". 
**The method by which this amount was calculated is 
described in detail in the testimony of Mr. Scott Dixon at 
pp. 84-85 of the transcript and is not repeated herein in 
the interest of brevity. Mr. Dixon's calculations were not 
controverted by respondents. 
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Less amount of offset claims 
amortized to principal: ($435.75)* 
Less judgment re post office roof: ($12, 250. 00) 
Adjusted principal balance owing: $67,249.83 
Divided by accelerated principal 
balance of Note sought by Stacey 
at trial without adjustments 
($67,249.83/$lll,611.33): $111,611.33** 
Percentage of Stacey's success and the 
fees and expenses to which it is 
entitled ($67,249.83/$lll,611.33): 60% 
CONCLUSION: RELIEF REQUESTED 
In conclusion, for the reasons set forth herein, this 
Court should reverse the district court's conclusions of law 
that Stacey was not entitled to accelerate the Note, or to 
recover any of its attorneys' fees and expenses. Stacey is 
entitled to the accelerated principal balance owing under 
the Note as of July 1, 1985, minus respondents' judgment 
relating to the Ogden post office roof, with interest 
accruing on the balance at eighteen percent from July 1, 
1985 until paid. While Stacey has calculated herein the 
accelerated amount owing as of May 30, 1986 as $78,326.70, 
(see supra, at 30, 1IA, "Adjusted accelerated principal 
*See, Amortization Schedule included in the 
addendum hereto as Exhibit "F". 
**The method by which this amount was calculated is 
described in detail in the testimony of Mr. Scott Dixon at 
pp. 84-85 of the transcript and is not repeated herein in 
the interest of brevity. Mr. Dixon's calculations were not 
controverted by respondents. 
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balance with interest as of 5/30/86"), it would be 
appropriate that this issue be remanded to the district 
court in order that the appropriate findings and 
calculations be made under the court's supervision. 
Additionally, Stacey submits that the issue concerning 
the percentage of expenses and attorneys' fees to which it 
is entitled should properly be "remanded to the district 
court for the appropriate findings and calculations. To 
reiterate, Stacey contends that it is entitled to its 
expenses and fees, including those associated with this 
appeal, in proportion to its successful defense to 
respondents' offsets and counterclaims. While the 
percentage of fees and expenses to which Stacey is entitled 
would change depending upon this Court's conclusion on the 
acceleration issue, the percentages should be calculated in 
the manner set forth at pages 30-31 herein, with interest on 
the amount of expenses and fees due at the statutory rate 
from May 30, 1986 until paid. 
DATED: January 'Vf^ , 1987. 
HANSEN & ANDERSON 
/.-J... .s /- ,Nr 
William P. Schwartz 
50 West Broadway, 6th Floor ^ 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 30th day 
1987, I caused to be hand-delivered four true 
copies of the foregoing Appellant's Brief to: 
Ronald G. Russell 
Kimball, Parr, Crockett & Waddoups 
185 South State, #1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
/ 
/ 
Clark Waddoups, Esq., #A3975 
Ronald G. Russell, Esq., #A4134 
LARSEN, KIMBALL, PARR i CROCKETT 
Attorneys for pefendants and Counterclaimants 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OP UTAH 
STACEY PROPERTIES, a Utah , 
limited partnership, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BEN WIXEN, PRANCINE WIXEN, 
BERNIE GOLER AND BONNIE GOLER, 
Defendants and 
Counterclaimants, 
vs. ; 
J. RON STACEY, 
Counterclaim j 
Defendant. j 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 90743 
This matter having been tried to the Court on May 28, 
29, and 30, 1986, the Honorable David Roth presiding, and 
Pindings of Pact and Conclusion of Law having been duly entered, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows: 
1. That plaintiff Stacey Properties and J. Ron Stacey 
do recover from defendants and counterclaimants Ben Wixen, 
Prancine Wixen, Bernie Goler, and Bonnie Goler, the total sum of 
$1,120.32, which sum includes prejudgment interest accrued prior 
to May 30, 1986, together with interest thereon at the rate of 
12% per annum from May 30, 1986 until paid; 
2. #That said defendants and counterclaimants do 
recover on their counterclaims from Stacey Properties and J. Ron 
Stacey the total sum of $20,362.94, which sum includes 
prejudgment interest accrued prior to May 30, 1986, together with 
interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum from May 30, 1986 
until paid; 
3. That the foregoing amount awarded to defendants and 
counterclaimants is hereby ordered offset against the cumulative 
monthly installments of $16,099.38 which are due as of May 1, 
1986 under that certain Promissory Note dated May 22, 1984 and 
payable to plaintiff (the "Note") and the remainder of such award 
is to be offset against future installments under the Note until 
such amount has been fully satisfied? 
4. That plaintiff's claim herein for acceleration of 
the Note is dismissed with prejudice, no cause of action; 
5. That plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey are released from 
any further obligation to maintain or repair the Ogden post 
office roof from and after May 30, 1986; 
6. That defendants1 and counterclaimants1 Fourth 
Counterclaim is dismissed with prejudice, no cause of action; and 
7. That none of the parties are awarded attorney's 
fees and all parties shall bear their opm, costs. 
/ - J^e^ 
DATED this /.J day of Jfoguot-, 1986. 
^^rJk 
/ 
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Ju*je David E. Roth 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Robert M. Anderson of 
Hansen and Anderson 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and J. Ron Stacey 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 18th day of August, 1986, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT was 
hand-delivered to: 
Robert M. Anderson, Esq. 
William P. Schwartz, Esq. 
HANSEN & ANDERSON 
Valley Tower Building 
50 West Broadway, Sixth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Clark Waddoups, Esq., #A3975 
Ronald G. Russell, Esq., #A4134 
LARSEN, KIMBALL, PARR & CROCKETT 
Attorneys for defendants and Counterclaimants 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OP UTAH 
STACEY PROPERTIES, a Utah 
limited partnership, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BEN WIXEN, PRANCINE WIXEN, 
BERNIE GOLER AND BONNIE GOLER, 
Defendants and 
Counterclaimants, 
vs. 
J. RON STACEY, 
Counterclaim 
Defendant. 
> . FINDINGS OF PACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OP LAW 
Civil No. 90743 
This matter, having been tried to the Court on Nay 28, 
29, and 30, 1986, and plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey having been 
represented by Robert M. Anderson and William P. Schwartz, and 
defendants having been represented by Clark Waddoups and Ronald 
G. Russell, and the Court, having heard the evidence and argument 
of counsel, hereby makes the following findings and conclusions: 
1*V/I I •#•%!••» ** 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. * On May 22, 1984, plaintiff Stacey Properties, 
counterclaim defendant J. Ron Stacey, and defendants Ben Wixen, 
Francine Wixen, Bernie Goler, and Bonnie Goler entered into a 
written agreement (the "Agreement") whereby certain properties 
were sold by plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey to defendants, including 
the main Ogden post office located in Ogden, Utah, and the 
Commonwealth Square Shopping Center located in Sunset, Utah. 
2. As partial payment for the properties, defendants 
executed an $80,000 promissory note dated Nay 22, 1984, payable 
to plaintiff in monthly installments of $731.79, beginning on 
June 1, 1984 (the "Note"). 
3. Defendants paid to plaintiff $744.60 on August 1, 
1984; and $731.79 on August 29, 1984. 
4. The Note contains a provision concerning offsets 
which states: 
Contemporaneous with Makers' execution of 
this Note, Makers, Properties and J. Ron Stacey 
("Stacey") have executed a letter agreement 
relating to the sale and purchase of certain 
parcels of realty located in Davis and Weber 
Counties, State of Utah. Pursuant to Section 17 
of said letter agreement, Properties and Stacey 
agree to indemnify, defend, and hold Makers 
harmless and to reimburse Makers on demand from 
and against, for, and with respect to inter alia, 
any claim, liability or obligation relating ro 
attributable to any breach of failure of any 
representation or warranty given by Properties 
and Stacey contained in the letter agreement 
or any failure of either of 
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them to perform any covenant to be performed 
under such agreement or any such instrument. 
Makers shall have the right to offset against 
any amounts due or to become due to 
Properties under this Note any such 
reimbursement due to Makers under Section 17 
of said letter agreement or under any other 
provision thereof . . ., provided, however, 
that Makers give Properties written notice of 
the amount to be offset and the specific 
reasons therefor. 
5. On September 5, 1984, defendants sent written 
notice to plaintiff asserting an offset against amounts due or to 
become due under the Note for expenses incurred by defendants in 
replacing an air-conditioning unit at the Ogden post office. The 
amount and specific reasons for the offset were stated in that 
letter. 
6. Defendants did not make the September, 1984 
monthly payment under the Note and made no payments under the 
Note after claiming said offset. As of May 1, 1986, the total of 
unpaid installments under the Note was $16,099.38. 
7. Plaintiff sent a letter to defendants on September 
12, 1984 asserting that it was accelerating the entire balance 
due and owing under the Note and further asserting that 
defendants had failed to make payments in th* time and manner 
required by the Note. The Note provides: 
In the event this Note, or any obligation 
provided to be satisfied or performed under 
any agreement, instrument or document 
connected with or related to this Note, now 
existing or otherwise, is breached or is not 
satisfied, performed or paid, at the time and 
in the manner required, Properties, at its 
option and without notice, may declare the 
unpaid principal balance and accrued interest 
immediately due and payable and makers agree 
to immediately pay the same. 
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8, The Agreement provides: 
[Stacey Properties and J. Ron Stacey] agree 
to remedy any latent defects in materials or 
worDcmanship which arise within a one year 
period from the date of closing. We 
represent and warrant to you that all 
heating, cooling, electrical, plumbing and 
sewer systems at the properties are in 
working order and will be operative at 
closing We will perform all necessary 
repairs to the roof of the Ogden post office 
building which are reasonably required to 
maintain a watertight roof surface for a 
period of sixty-seven months from the date of 
closing at our sole cost and expense. 
9. At trial, defendants claimed offsets against the 
Note for the following items and amounts: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
(f) 
(9) 
Ogden Post Office Air 
Conditioner Replacement 
Commonwealth Sewer Repair 
Ogden Post Office Roof 
Commonwealth Sidewalk Repair 
Commonwealth Electrical Repair 
Property Tax Adjustment 
Commonwealth Fire Sprinkler 
$25,063.80 
$ 1,037.83 
$43,750.00 
$ 7,600.00 
$ 1,409.70 
$ 3,028.52 
$ 1,190.00 
10. Defendants provided plaintiff with written notice 
of each claimed offset, which notice stated the amounts claimed 
and reasons therefor. 
11. According to the evidence presented, the Court's 
findings regarding the offsets claimed by defendants are as 
follows: 
a. Post Office Air-Conditioning Unit. 
(1) The air-conditioning unit, according 
#to the circumstantial evidence presented, was 
not in working order and was not operative on 
May 22, 1984; 
(2) The air-conditioning unit had an 
expected useful life of approximately fifteen 
years; 
(3) On May 22, 1984, the unit would have 
had approximately 25% of its useful life 
remaining under normal conditions; 
(4) Plaintiff was notified by Eugene 
Perren of the post office by at least May 29, 
1984 that the air-conditioning unit was not 
operable. Plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey failed 
to make repairs to the unit after receiving 
notice from the post office that the unit was 
inoperable; 
(5) Defendants incurred a total expense 
of $22,758.00 to replace the air-conditioning 
unit, the first installment of which in the 
amount of $6,000 was paid on August 21, 1984. 
b. Commonwealth Square Sewer System. 
(1) Defendants discovered a 16"-18H gap 
in a sewer pipe at Commonwealth Square within 
one year of May 22, 1984, which gap was never 
remedied by plaintiff or J. Ron Stacey. 
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(2) The subject gap was not discovered 
prior to closing and could not have been 
discovered by a reasonable inspection due to 
its nature and location; 
(3) Defendants incurred an expense of 
$1,037.83 to repair said gap. 
c. Ogden Post Office Roof. 
(1) The Ogden .post office roof has 
leaked on numerous occasions following 
closing and plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey have 
failed to perform all necessary repairs which 
were reasonably required to maintain a 
watertight roof surface; 
(2) According to the evidence presented 
by defendants, the cost of replacing the post 
office roof with a new "twenty year" roof 
would be $49,000; 
(3) The age of the roof at the date of 
closing was approximately twelve years; 
(4) Defendants have not incurred any 
out-of-pocket expenses to repair said roof as 
of the time of trial. 
d. Commonwealth Square Sidewalk. 
(1) The sidewalks at Commonwealth Square 
are currently in a defective condition in 
several places; 
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(2) The defects were discoverable by 
defendants prior to May 22, 1984; 
• e. Commonwealth Electrical System. 
(1) Defendants failed to prove by a 
preponderance of evidence that the 
Commonwealth electrical system was not in 
working order at the date of closing. 
f. Property Tax Adjustment. 
(1) Defendants failed to prove by a 
preponderance of evidence that plaintiff owed 
defendants additional amounts pursuant to the 
parties1 agreement to adjust the property 
taxes payable by the parties according to the 
actual 1984 tax assessment. 
(2) Plaintiff moved at the start of 
trial to amend its Complaint to include a 
claim for the property tax proration owed 
plaintiff by defendants, which motion was 
granted. 
(3) Defendants have failed to make 
payment to plaintiff of $958.10 for which the 
tenants at Commonwealth were responsible and 
for which plaintiff claimed a pro-rata 
credit. 
g. Commonwealth Fire Sprinkling System. 
(1) Defendants failed to present any 
evidence that the fire sprinkling system at 
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Commonwealth Square was not in working order 
at the date of closing, 
12. • These Findings of Fact shall be construed to be 
Conclusions of Law to the extent that same may be found to 
constitute Conclusions of Law. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
13. The Court makes the following conclusions with 
respect to each of the claimed offsets: 
a. Post Office Air-Conditioning Unit. 
(1) The east air-conditioning unit at 
the Ogden post office was not in working 
order and operative on May 22, 1984 in breach 
of the terms of the Agreement; 
(2) Defendants would receive a windfall 
if plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey were held 
responsible for the entire cost of 
replacement; 
(3) Defendants are entitled to offset 
against amounts due or to become due under 
the Note the amount of $5,689.50, which is 
25% of the total replacement cost of the air 
conditioner incurred by defendants, together 
with prejudgment interest on that amount at 
12% per annum from August 21, 1984 to May 30, 
1986 or $1,209.89. 
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b. Commonwealth Sewer System, 
(1) A latent defect in the sewer system 
at Commonwealth Square Shopping Center arose 
within one year from May 22, 1984, which 
defect plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey failed to 
remedy in breach of the terns of the 
Agreement. 
(2) Defendants are entitled to offset 
against amounts due or to become due under 
the Note the amount of $1,037,83 for costs 
incurred by defendants to repair said sewer 
system, together with pre-judgment interest 
on that amount from January 1> 1985 to May 
30, 1986 or $175.72, 
c. Ogden Post Office Roof. 
(1) Plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey have 
failed to perform all necessary repairs which 
were reasonably required to maintain the 
Ogden post office roof in a watertight 
condition in breach of the terms of the 
Agreement; 
(2) Defendants would receive a windfall 
if plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey were held 
responsible for the entire cost of a new 
roof; 
(3) Defendants are entitled to recover 
against plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey an award 
•9-
of damages proximately resulting from said breach 
in "the amount of $12,250, which is 25% of the 
cost of a new "twenty-year" roof; 
(4) Because defendants had incurred no 
out-of-pocket expenses with respect to said roof 
prior to trial, no offset against the Note arose 
under Paragraph 17 of the Agreeaent and the Note. 
(5) Plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey shall have no 
further obligations under the Agreement with 
respect to the Ogden post office roof from and 
after Nay 30, 1986. 
d. Commonwealth Square Sidewalk. 
(1) The defects claimed by defendants with 
respect to the Commonwealth Square Shopping 
Center were not latent defects within the terms 
of the agreement; 
(2) Defendants are not entitled to any award 
with respect to said sidewalks. 
e. Commonwealth Electrical System. 
(1) The defendants have failed to prove by a 
preponderance of evidence that the Commonwealth 
electrical system was not in working order on Nay 
22, 1984. 
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(2) Defendants are not entitled to any 
award with respect to said electrical system. 
f. Property Tax Adjustment, 
(1) Pursuant to the Agreement, plaintiff 
and J* Ron Stacey are entitled to recover 
$958.10 from defendants jointly and 
severally, together with prejudgment interest 
at the rate of 12% per annum from January 1, 
1985 to May 30, 1986 in the amount of 
$162.22, as a pro-rata credit for property 
taxes which were paid or should have been 
paid to defendants by certain tenants. 
(2) Defendants are not entitled to any 
award with respect to property taxes. 
g. Commonwealth Fire Sprinkling System. 
(1) Defendants presented no evidence 
that the Commonwealth fire sprinkling system 
was not in working order at the date of 
closing. 
(2) Defendants are not entitled to any 
award with respect to said system. 
14. The time at which a default justifying 
acceleration is measured is at the time of the attempted 
acceleration. No default had occurred on September 12, 1984 
justifying acceleration and the attempted acceleration by 
plaintiff was of no effect. 
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15. Plaintiff was not entitled to accelerate the Note 
at the time the complaint was filed because the payments made by 
the defendants* to replace the subject air conditioner exceeded 
amounts due under the Note on that date. 
16. Acceleration is a harsh remedy and the plaintiff 
is not entitled to acceleration as of the date of trial for the 
additional reason that acceleration should not be dependent upon 
the uncertainties of delays in bringing a case to trial, 
17. Because defendants are entitled to a money 
judgment with respect to damages awarded for breach of the 
agreement to maintain the post office roof, acceleration of the 
Note at this time would be inappropriate. 
18. The total amount awarded to defendants, including 
prejudgment interest, is to be offset against the cumulative 
monthly installments under the Note of $16,099.38 (as of May 1, 
1986) and against future installments under the Note until such 
amount has been fully satisfied. 
19. Pursuant to stipulation, defendants' Fourth 
Counterclaim shall be dismissed with prejudice. 
20. Plaintiff did not prevail on its complaint for 
acceleration and is therefore not entitled to an award of 
attorney's fees. 
21. The defendants would be entitled to an award of 
attorney's fees if they had simply defended the case 
successfully, but are not entitled to an award of fees because 
they did not prevail on many of their counterclaims. 
22. All parties shall bear their own costs. 
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23. These Conclusions of Law shall be construed to be 
Findings of Pact to the extent that the same may be found to 
constitute FinSings of Fact. ^Z-Jr^r_a-
DATED this /"> day of JWgust, 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
V"".-
x^ 
y^ v 
SWdc^ e David E. Roth 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Robert M. Anderson of 
Hansen and Anderson 
Attorneys for P l a i n t i f f 
and J , Ron St< 
Roffa^d G. RuSSeipol 
Larjten, Kimball, Parr & Crockett 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Counterclaimaints 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 18th day of August 1986, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was hand-delivered to: 
Robert M. Anderson, Esq. 
William P. Schwartz, Esq. 
HANSEN & ANDERSON 
Valley Tower Building 
50 West Broadway, Sixth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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May 1, 1984 
Mr. Ben Wixen 
Ms. Francine A. Wixen 
Dr. Bernie Goler 
Ms. Bonnie Goler - % 
1911 South Commerce Center, E. 
Suite 211 
San Bernadino. California 92408 
Dear Mr. and Ms. Wixen and Dr. and Ms. Goler: 
This letter is written to set forth the terms of our 
agreement this date relating to the sale by Stacey Properties, 
a Utah Limited Partnership, and me to you as tenants in common. 
1. Property Sold 
The properties to be sold include the following: 
a. Commonwealth Square Shopping Center, Units 
1-18, inclusive. 
b. Pizza Hut, Ogden, Utah. 
c. Eastern Winds Restaurant, Ogden, Utah. 
d. Jiffy Lube Center, Ogden, Utah 
e. Post Office Building, Ogden, Utah. 
All of the said properties are more fully described in 
Exhibit "A" attached hereto. The properties have been 
inspected by you and are purchased "as is11. Said buildings 
vary from the plans, specifications and building contracts 
being delivered to you only as set forth on Exhibit B attached 
hereto and in other minor ways which do not materially affect 
the said properties. We agree to remedy any latent defects in 
cvLJini-r r\ 
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materials or workmanship which arise within a one year period 
from the date of closing. We represent and warrant to you that 
all heating, cooling, electrical, plumbing and sewer systems at 
the properties are in working order and will be operative at 
closing and that the footings and foundations are free from 
material structural defects. We further warrant to you that 
the roof at the Eastern Winds and Pizza Hut Restaurants are 
free of any defects in workmanship and material and we warrant 
that we will make any reasonably necessary repairs to said 
roofs required at any time within five years from the date of 
closing which arise as a direct result of defects in 
workmanship or materials. We further warrant to you that the 
roof at Commonwealth Square is free of any defects in 
workmanship and material and we warrant that we will make any 
reasonably necessary repairs to said roof required at any time 
within one year from the date of closing which arise as a 
direct result of defects in workmanship or materials. We will 
perform all necessary repairs to the roof of the Post Office 
building which are reasonably required to maintain a water 
tight roof surface for a period of sixty seven months from the 
date of closing at our sole cost and expense. 
2. Purchase Price 
The purchase price for all of the foregoing property 
is a total of $3,530,104.95. We will pay sales taxes directly 
attributable to the sale of personal property sold to you 
hereunder. The said purchase price is payable according to the 
following terms and at the times indicated: 
a. $10,000 cash paid this date, to our 
attorneys, Berman & Anderson, to be held in their 
trust account. 
b. The sum of $242,000.00 to be paid at the 
time of closing in cash funds (said amount to be 
increased or reduced for any reduction or increase, 
respectively, in the amount set forth in (e) hereafter 
which occurs prior to closing or for prorations set 
forth in paragraph 4). 
c. The sum of $80,000 evidenced by a promissory 
note payable to Stacey Properties in the form set 
forth in Exhibit "C" attached hereto and by this 
reference made a part hereof. 
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d. The sum of $2,900,000.00 paid to First 
Security Bank in accordance with the terms of a loan 
transaction set forth in detail in a letter from First 
Security Bank of Utah to each of you dated March 27. 
1984. First Security Bank will require and you agree 
to execute a deed of trust and promissory note in form 
acceptable to the bank which said documents will be in 
accordance with the terms of your separate agreement 
with the bank dated March 27, 1984. 
e. Assumption of Post Office building mortgage 
in the amount of approximately $298,104.95 to State 
Savings and Loan Association which you will assume and 
agree to pay. 
3. Conveyance 
The properties shall be conveyed, an undivided 
one-half interest to Dr. and Mrs. Goler and an undivided 
one-half interest as part of a Section 1031 exchange 
transaction involving Mr. and Mrs. Wixen and Val Ban Corp., 
each conveyance by a general warranty deed from the Sellers to 
the grantees. 
Mr. and Ms. Wixen shall have the right, without the 
need of any further approval or consent of us prior to the 
completion of the purchase of the subject property to transfer 
and assign all of their rights and obligations under this 
agreement to Val Ban Corp., a California corporation. 
Val Ban Corp., pursuant to the contractual obligation 
to purchase the subject property hereunder in accordance with 
the terms and provisions of that certain agreement of exchange 
entered into between Mr. and Ms. Wixen and Val Ban Corp. on 
July 12, 1983, shall complete said purchase according to the 
terms set forth in said agreement. Upon such assignment having 
been made by Mr. and Ms. Wixen and upon our receipt of written 
notice of the same, Mr. and Ms. Wixen shall have no further 
rights, obligations, or liabilities hereunder, all such rights, 
obligations and liabilities having been fully transferred and 
assigned to Val Ban Corp. Upon the conveyance of the undivided 
one-half interest in the properties from Val Ban Corp." to ^ ^ . 
Mr. and Ms. Wixen, Val Ban Corp. shall be released by us from 
its obligations under the promissory note (referred to in 
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paragraph 2(c) above, provided that Mr. and Ms. Wixen assume 
such promissory note obligation. 
4. Prorations and Closing Costs 
The rents, taxes, insurance, and utilities will be 
prorated as of the date of closing and appropriate credits of 
debits made to each of us. Taxes will be prorated on the basis 
of 1983 property taxes with a final adjustment to be made in 
November, 1984, at such time as the exact amount of 1984 taxes 
is known. It is contemplated that you will make similar 
adjustments with First Security Bank of Utah relating to the 
proration of rents. We will pay costs of recording deeds to 
you and the loan fee to First Security Bank in the approximate 
amount of $14,500. We and you will share equally the escrow 
fee. Each of the parties hereto will bear their own attorney's 
fees and costs for preparation of this agreement and in 
connection with the closing. 
5. Leases 
We heretofore delivered to you true, correct and 
complete originals of all tenant leases pertaining to the 
properties being sold to you. Such leases are valid and 
binding documents and are in full force and effect. Except for 
such leases, there are no other agreements in connection with 
leasing of said property between us and such tenants with 
respect to the properties. No party thereunder has any right, 
with the giving of notice or lapse of time or both, to 
terminate any lease or assert any claim thereunder, except as 
set forth in said leases. At the closing, we will by 
instrument satisfactory to you transfer, convey and assign to 
you all of our interest in said leases, including the right to 
receive rents thereunder. Prior to the closing, we will obtain 
for you letters from said tenants confirming the leases, and 
prepaid rents and in addition we will prepare and execute a 
joint letter advising the tenants of the transfer of ownership 
to you and directing such tenants to pay rents to you. Such 
transfer will not constitute a default under any of such 
leases. We will resolve any differences asserted by said 
tenants as it relates to prepaid rents or offsets claimed 
against future rentals becoming due under the terms of the said 
leases, and pay you for the amount of any such difference. 
Prepaid rents and security deposits will be accounted for and 
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paid to you at closing and you will be obligated for such 
deposits in accordance with the terms of said leases. 
6. Personal Property 
At the time of closing a bill of sale without 
warranties evidencing the sale by us to you of the equipment 
and persona 1 property ldeafted at the Biftefn Winds Restaurant, 
a complete list of which is set forth on Exhibit "D" attached 
hereto, will be provided to yo\f%elating to such equipment and 
personal property.^ " " ^ .'...*'"~1"' 
Ti—* Preliminary TtTle Imports _J;'"*r._ ; 
We have delivered to you this date copies of 
Preliminary Title Reports prepared by Home Abstract Company 
relating to the properties being sold, together with copies of 
various documents which are referred to in the said title 
reports. We represent and warrant that, except for those 
matters explicitly described in such Preliminary Title Reports, 
there are no liens, claims or encumbrances existing or which, 
based on facts existing prior to the closing, may be asserted 
against any of the properties. The proposed Section 1031 
exchange transaction will be closed through Home Abstract 
Company. An ALTA Owners Extended Coverage Title Policy in the 
amount of $3,530,104.9& will be provided to you through Home 
Abstract Company at *>ur''-'expense. ••**•" ...•**-•-•-
8. Allocation of Values 
The allocation of the purchase price of the respective 
properties being sold by us to you will be set forth in a 
Schedule approved by all parties at closing. 
9. Commissions 
We have made arrangements to pay Century 21 Harmston 
Realtors and Wixen Realty, a commission in the total amount of 
$38,000 with Wixen Realty to receive 50* thereof, in connection 
with the sale and you are not responsible for payment of any 
commission in connection with the subject transaction. 
Mr. Ben Wixen 
Ms. Francine A. Wixen 
Dr. Bernie Goler 
Ms. Bonnie Goler 
April 20. 1984 
Page 6 
10. Warranties 
At closing we will assign to you all contract 
warranties from third parties pertaining to the subject 
properties as they relate to any personal property, the 
structures, or any component parts thereof and we will make a 
reasonable effort to locate and deliver copies of all documents 
in our files with respect thereto. V£ff additibn. we will 
deliver to you at closing all original building contracts, 
plans, permits, and other documents pertaining to the 
properties purchased or the construction of same. We have 
advised you most of the properties were constructed without 
written building contracts. ^ " 
11. Possession ^ « ^ 
Possession of the properties being sold shall be 
delivered at the date of closing. 
12. Closing Date 
The closing date of this transaction and "closing" as 
used herein shall be May 4. 1984. or as said date shall be 
extended by mutual agreement between us. In the event said 
closing does not occur on said date or on the date of extension 
of the closing as mutually agreed to between us. each party 
shall have all remedies provided for by lav. 
13. Representations 
We have previously represented to you and we hereby 
affirm, to the best of our knowledge and belief, that the 
subject properties are in compliance with all applicable 
building rules and regulations, and there are no violations of 
any statutes or judicial orders pertaining to the subject 
properties. The subject properties are in compliance with all 
applicable zoning rules and regulations. There are no judicial 
orders specifically pertaining to the subject properties. We 
have provided you with copies of any special permits or 
conditional use permits relating to operation of the subject 
properties. There are no lawsuits, administrative proceedings, 
arbitrations or other proceedings pertaining to the subject 
properties or affecting such properties and to the best of our 
knowledge none have been threatened and there are no 
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governmental investigations relating thereto. In the event 
suit is filed by any third party to enjoin closing of the 
transaction or to rescind the sale transaction, we will defend 
said action at our sole cost and expense. 
Stacey Properties is a Utah limited partnership which 
has been duly formed and is validly existing under the laws of 
the State of Utah, and has all powers and authorities and all 
material governmental licenses, authorizations, consents and 
approvals required to carry on the business as now conducted by 
it, to own the properties being sold hereunder, to enter into 
this agreement, to execute and deliver the bill of sale, the 
deeds and the assignments contemplated hereby and to perform 
all of its obligations hereunder and thereunder. J. Ron Stacey 
is the owner of the Commonwealth Square property. The 
execution, delivery and performance by us of this agreement are 
within our power, have been duly authorized by all necessary 
action, require no action by or in respect of, or filing with, 
any partner or any governmental body, agency or official or any 
other party and do not contravene, or constitute a default 
under, any provision of applicable law or regulation or of the 
documents by which we were created and are governed or of any 
agreement, judgment, injunction, order, decree or other 
instrument binding upon us or result in the creation or 
imposition of any lien, charge, encumbrance or security 
interest on any of the properties being sold hereunder. We 
have delivered to you true and complete copies of all of the 
documents by which we were created and are governed which are 
valid and binding and are in full force and effect. We have 
not entered into any contract with any person to manage the 
properties or operate any portion thereof. 
14. Termite Inspection 
At the closing we will provide you with a standard 
inspection certificate indicating no terminate infestation 
issued by a recognized exterminator following inspection of the 
properties sold hereunder. 
15. Survey 
At the closing we will furnish to you surveys prepared 
by a registered surveyor showing the properties being sold and 
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the location of buildings thereon, the location of any streets, 
rights of way. or rights of access. 
16. Conditions 
(i) Your obligation to purchase the properties is 
expressly conditioned upon the following: 
a. That you obtain a loan from First Security 
Bank of Utah in accordance with the terms set forth in 
the letter from First Security to you dated March 27. 
1984. or as said loan is amended or altered by mutual 
agreement between you and the bank; 
b. That all representations and warranties made 
by us shall be true and correct on and as of the date 
of closing as if made on such date; 
c. That we shall have fully performed and 
complied with all of the obligations to be performed 
by us in this agreement; 
d. That you shall have received an opinion from 
our attorneys. Berman & Anderson, in the form set 
forth on Exhibit "E" hereto; 
e. That the assumption of the Post Office 
building mortgage has been approved by State Savings 
and Loan Association and the interest rate thereon 
shall not exceed 11 l/2\ per annum; and 
f. That there shall have been no material 
adverse change in any of the properties or title 
thereto since April 1. 1984. 
(ii) Our obligation to sell the properties 
is expressly conditioned upon the following: 
(a) That First Security Bank release us from all of 
our obligations and liabilities to said Bank; 
(b) That you shall have fully performed and complied 
with all of the obligations to be performed by you in this 
agreement; 
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(c) That J. Ron Stacey and Geraldine Stacey shall be 
released from any liability to State Savings and Loan 
Association arising in connection with the Post Office mortgage 
being assumed by you. 
17. Indemnity 
We agree to indemnify, defend and hold you harmless 
and reimburse you on demand from and against, for. and with 
respect to any claim, liability, obligation, loss, damage, 
deficiency, assessment, judgment, cost or expense (including 
without limitation reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses, and 
costs and expenses reasonably incurred, in investigating, 
preparing or defending against any litigation or claim), 
action, suit, proceeding or demand, of any kind or character, 
arising out of or in any manner incident, relating or 
attributable to: 
a. any breach or failure of any representation 
or warranty given by us contained in this agreement or 
in any certificate, instrument, assignment, conveyance 
or transfer, or other document or agreement executed 
by either of us in connection with this agreement; 
b. any failure of either of us to perform or 
observe, or to have performed or observed, in full, 
any covenant, agreement, or condition to be performed 
or observed by us under this agreement or under any 
certificate or other instrument, document or agreement 
executed by us in connection with this agreement; 
c. the assertion by any person of any claim, 
liability, obligation, agreement or undertaking which 
relates to the properties or which in any manner 
affects title to the properties which arises out of 
any facts, transactions or circumstances occurring on 
or prior to the closing date; or 
d. the enforcement of your rights under this 
agreement. 
18. Survival. 
The representations, warranties and covenants given by 
us contained herein and the certificates delivered at the 
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closing or otherwise delivered pursuant to this agreement, 
shall survive the closing without regard to any investigation 
made by you. 
19. Waiver and Modification. 
This agreement may not be amended, modified, 
superseded or cancelled, and none of the terms, covenants, 
representations, warranties or conditions, may be waived except 
by written instrument executed by all of us and for, or, in the 
case of a waiver, by the party waiving compliance. Failure of 
any party at any time or times to require strict performance of 
any provision hereof shall not in any manner affect the right 
of such party at a later date to enforce the same. No waiver 
by any party of the breach of any term, covenant, 
representation or warranty contained in this agreement as a 
condition to such party's obligations hereunder, shall 
constitute a release or affect any liability resulting from 
said breach. 
20. Successors in Interest; Assignment. 
This agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the 
benefit of the successors and assigns of the parties. Except 
as provided herein, no assignment of any rights and delegations 
of any obligations for which provision is made in this 
agreement may be made by any party without the prior written 
consent of the other party. 
If the foregoing sets forth the terms of our 
understanding, please execute this agreement where set forth 
below. 
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Accepted and agreed to this 
Z-~ZLday Pf Aprils 1984. 
Francine Wixen wixen 
MnJ JL<4 
rnstvUs A4*U. PiM^fitZfuau, 4^<J~*jtJt-
rnie Goler / 
lapyisyvcc Jh&i s 
Bonnie Goler 
4066a 
050184 
I 
May 25, 1984 
The Undersign hereby agrees to be liable as co-makers of that certain Promisory 
Note, as said Note as been modified by interlineations and additions previously 
agreed to by Val Ban Corp., Bernie and Bonnie Goler. 
A photo copy of said Note ( reflecting such modification is attached hereto as 
Ehlbit "A". 
jfc UA**Usm 
Francine A. Uixen 
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EXHIBIT D 
( 
EXHIBIT "A" 
PROMISSORY NOTE 
$80f000.00 Salt Lake City, Utah 
May 2Jr 1984 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned ("Makers'1) promise 
to pay to the order of STACEY PROPERTIES, a Utah limited 
partnership ("Properties"), or its assigns, the principal sura of 
Eighty Thousand Dollars ($80,000.00), together with interest on 
said principal sum, or the unpaid balance thereof, from and after 
the date hereof, at the rate of ten and one-half percent (10 
1/2X) P^r annum. Principal and interest shall be paid in monthly 
installments of $731.79 each, payable on the first day of each 
month commencing June 1, 1984. Payments shall be applied first 
to accrued interest with the remainder applied to principal. The 
entire principal balance.and all accrued interest shall be due 
and payable on the 1st day of May, 1994. 
Contemporaneous with Makers1 execution of this Note, 
Makers, Properties and J. Ron Stacey ("Stacey") have executed a 
letter agreement relating to the sale and purchase of certain 
parcels of realty located in Davis and Weber Counties, State of 
Utah. Pursuant to Section 17 of said letter agreement, 
Properties and Stacey agree to indemnify, defend and hold Makers 
harmless and to reimburse Makers on demand-from and against, for, 
and with respect to, inter alia, any claim, liability or 
obligation relating or attributable to any breach or failure of 
any representation or warranty given by Properties and Stacey 
contained in the letter agreement or any instrument executed by 
either of them in connection therewith or any failure of either 
of them to perform any covenant to be performed under such 
agreement or any such instrument. Makers shall have the right to 
offset against any amounts due or to become due to Properties 
under this Note any such reimbursement due to Makers under 
Section 17 of said letter agreement or under any other provision 
thereof or of any document executed in conjunction therewith, 
provided, however, that Makers give Properties written notice of 
the amount to be offset and the specific reasons therefor. 
In the event this Note, or any obligation provided to 
be satisfied or performed under any agreement, instrument or 
document connected with or related to this Note, now existing or 
otherwise, is breached or is not satisfied, performed or paid, at 
the time and in the manner required, Properties, at its option 
and without notice, may declare the unpaid principal balance and 
accrued interest immediately due. and payable and Makers agree to 
immediately pay the same. Makers agree to pay any and all costs 
and expenses (regardless of the particular nature thereof and 
, of.aiiz .and |dl. 
qf^co^ancyTy 
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uo^eat,'*H&cludli^ 'reasonable attorneys* :fees) which say be r ^ f ^ ^ 
eurrad by or in connaction with tha enforcement or performance ,;v -; «^. 
of .any of the*rights *of Properties haraundar or under any -?;/•-•'-.. 
agreement,'instrument or document connactad with or ralatad to '"-.-. 
.^vthis Hota. Zf principal or intarast owing haraundar art not paid 
:fK:vhtn dui, ' inttrt i t shall tharaaftar aecrua on tha unpaid 
?;>:principal balanca at tha rata of aightaan parcant (18Z) por 
i>;<:; annua, both bafora and aftar Judgaant. Tha antira belanee of 
^ ^  principal and intarast owing haraundar shall aatura and ba 
.'payable in tha avent of sala or transfar by Makars of a l l or any . 
portion of tha Commonwealth Square Shopping Center locatad in Alk/y 
,r Sunaat, Utah ("tha Center"), provided, however, that {\ykM4. fjO(Al 
•--/rt/fito//fffltfit* v2) tha transfar of a l l or any portion of tha 
• ••: Cmtir to a corporation* partnership or othar antity which i s 
•V control lad by Makars or any ona of thaa or a linaal dascandant hV 
".' &i£M?P&ot Makars or any ona of than, or* (3) tha transfar to a 
spouse ,orlineal dascandant ui •nuooUir of a Maker or to a trust 
naaing a Maker or a spouseprlineal descendant W/W&ttfitf of a 
Maker as a beneficiary/ *ihall not ba deeaed to accelerata tha 
— maturity data for payment of principal and intarast owing 
:". hereunder. Tha tara "control** means ownership of more than 4zctyor* hund 
percent &30X) of tha capital of a partnership or unincorporated J]fK//( 
entity oPtlie ownership of aora than lifttt percent L3M) of a l l Mlsi/'1' 
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Presentment f o r payment, p r o t e s t and n o t i c e of p r o t e s t 
e n i of non-payment of t h i s Note are hereby waived. 
In the event Properties determines that i t wil l s e l l or .• 
discount this Note, and i f Makars are not then in default 
hereunder, then Properties shall offer tha right to Makars to 
purchase this Note on tha saaa terms sat forth in said offer. 
This Note i s executed in connection with and pursuant 
to tha terms of tha latter agreeaant above-mentioned and certain 
othar written agreeaants entered into between Makars, Properties 
and Staeay, "and tha terms thereof ara hereby incorporated into 
and by reference aada a part of th is Hota. 
- tha sale or transfar by Makars* of V '?*£**£& * California 
ttiit 18 in the Center (provided, however., c o ^ * w " » . 0 1 *, 
that Makers shall pay Properties $10,000 PY *t/<Z4X<* / * - s W i ~ v^i 
at the closing of such sale if, but only if, / - • /% 
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h *the leasing or ar ana a n portions or tne / iter to Tenants tor purposes of occur -y by Tenants, *" 
t 
whether incurred with or without suit or before or after 
judgment, including reasonable attorneys9 fees) which may be 
incurred by or in connection with the enforcement or performance 
of any of the rights of Properties hereunder or under any 
agreement, instrument or document connected with or related to 
this Note. If principal or interest owing hereunder are not paid 
when due, interest shall thereafter accrue on the unpaid 
principal balance at the rate of eighteen percent (18%) per 
annum, both before and after judgment. The entire balance of 
principal and interest owing hereunder shall mature and be 
payable in the event of sale or transfer by Makers of all or any 
portion of the Commonwealth Square Shopping Center located in J 
Sunset, Utah ("the Center"), provided, however, that (1)*****
 ;>V 
tgQiiofeg ef leaseheld interests by Makers of all eg any pegfcien ' 
of the Center, (2) the transfer of all or any portion of the 
Center to a corporation, partnership or other entity which is , 
controlled by Makers or any one of them or a lineal descendant <e? y^T 
ansectey of Makers or any one of them, •# (3) the transfer to a fyf 
spouse?^ lineal descendant eg ancestor of a Maker or to a trust 
naming a Maker or a spousV;/ lineal descendant er anaestsr of a 
Maker as a beneficiary**shall not be deemed to accelerate the 
maturity date for payment of principal and interest owing rfy' 
hereunder. The term "control" means ownership of more than fiftyone hum 
percent (f95-)lo"the capital of a partnership or unincorporated 
entity or the ownership of more than/fifty percent (W#) of all 3*f-* 
classes of stock of a corporation, one hundred 100% (j 
Presentment for payment, protest and notice of protest 
and of non-payment of this Note are hereby waived. 
In" the event Properties determines that it will sell or 
discount this Note, and if Makers are not then in default 
« hereunder, then Properties shall offer the right to Makers to 
purchase this Note on the same terms set forth in said offer. 
This Note is executed in connection with and pursuant 
to the terms of the letter agreement above-mentioned and certain 
other written agreements entered into between Makers, Properties 
and Stacey, and the terms thereof are hereby incorporated into 
and by reference made a part of this Note. 
VAL BAN CORP., a California 
corporation y ^ ' 
(SY "*X*> P~£~ *'" ** 
1 **the sale or transfer by Makers of Unit 18 in the Center (provided, 
^ y however, that Makers shall pay Properties §10,000.00 at the closing 
\ () of such sale if, but only if/th« price for such Unit 18 equals or 
U
 exceeds $120,000.00), 
J 
i JniTLcc ArtS/AJ diucLdf uZZfr,>ut, «-*H * 5 ^ 
Bernie Golftr 7~~ 
Bonnie Goler 
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PAYMENT SUMMARY 
Cumulative 
Payment 
Amount 
1. $731.79 
2. $731.79 
3. $731.79 
4. $731.79 
5. $731.79 
6. $731.79 
7. $731.79 
8. $731.79 
9. $731.79 
10. $731.79 
11. $731.79 
12. $731.79 
13. $731.79 
14. $731.79 
15. $731.79 
16. $731.79 
17. $731.79 
18. $731.79 
19. $731.79 
20. $731.79 
21. $731.79 
22. $731.79 
23. $731.79 
24. $731.79 
25. $731.79 
Date Payment Due 
June 1, 1984 
July 1, 1984 
August 1, 1984 
September 1, 1984 
October 1, 1984 
November 1, 1984 
December 1, 1984 
January 1, 1985 
February 1, 1985 
March 1, 1985 
April 1, 1985 
May 1, 1985 
June 1, 1985 
July 1, 1985 
August 1, 1985 
September 1, 1985 
October 1, 1985 
November 1, 1985 
December 1, 1985 
January 1, 1986 
February 1, 1986 
March 1, 1986 
April 1, 1986 
May 1, 1986 
June 1, 1986 
Date Payment Received 
Not Received 
August 29, 1984 
August 1, 1984 
Not Received 
Not Received 
Not Received 
Not Received 
Not Received 
Not Received 
Not Received 
Not Received 
Not Received 
Not Received 
Not Received 
Not Received 
Not Received 
Not Received 
Not Received 
Not Received 
Not Received 
Not Received 
Not Received 
Not Received 
Not Received 
Not Received (assumed) 
Amount Defaulted 
Received Installments 
-0- $731.79 (1) 
$731.79 $731.79(2) 
$744.60 $731.79 (3) 
-0- $1,463.58 (4) 
-0- $2,195.37 (5) 
-0- $2,927.16 (6) 
-0- $3,658.95 (7) 
-0- $4,390.74 (8) 
-0- $5,122.53(9) 
-0- $5,854.32 (10) 
-0- $6,586.11 (11) 
-0- $7,317.90 (12) 
-0- $8,049.69 (13) 
-0- $8,781.48 (14) 
-0- $9,513.27(15) 
-0- $10,245.06 (16) 
-0- $10,976.85(17) 
-0- $11,708.64(18) 
-0- $12,440.43 (19) 
-0- $13,172.22 (20) 
-0- $13,904.01 (21) 
-0- $14,635.80 (22) 
-0- $15,367.59(23) 
-0- $16,099.38 (24) 
-0- $16,831.17 (25) 
r * \ / L _ i i m T 
EXHIBIT "PM* 
AMORTIZATION SCHEDULE 
($80f000 Principal Balance @ 10.5% Interest Over 30 Years) 
Payment No. Payment Due Payment of Payment of 
Principal Interest 
1 (6/1/85) 
2 (7/1/85) 
3 (8/1/85) 
4 (9/1/85) 
5 (10/1/85) 
6 (11/1/85) 
7 (12/1/85) 
8 (1/1/86) 
9 (2/1/86) 
10 (3/1/86) 
11 (4/1/86) 
12 (5/1/86) 
13 (6/1/86) 
731.79 
731.79 
731.79 
731.79 
731.79 
731.79 
731.79 
731.79 
731.79 
731.79 
731.79 
731.79 
731.79 
31.79 
32.07 
32.35 
32.63 
32.99 
33.21 
33.50 
33.79 
34.08 
34.38 
34.68 
34.99 
35.29 
700.00 
699.72 
699.44 
699.16 
698.07 
698.58 
698.29 
698.00 
697.71 
697.41 
697.11 
696.80 
696.50 
Totals: 9,513.27 435.75 9,077.52 
as of 6/1/86 
*This schedule was not introduced as 
evidence at the trial of this matter. 
